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Subverting Workers’ Rights:
Class Action Waivers and
the Arbitral Threat to the NLRA
Nicole Wredberg*
The National Labor Relations Act (“NRLA”) was born out of the industrial strife of the
Great Depression and provides for employee collective rights in order to prevent the
potentially devastating economic consequences of an unstable working environment. The
rights provided by the NLRA generally encompass the right to employee collective
activity, including collective legal activity and unionizing, which seeks to better working
conditions. These substantive rights cannot be waived through any employment
agreement, but the Supreme Court has never decided the precise issue of whether
pursuing a class action is a substantive right under the NLRA as a protected employee
collective activity. The enforceability of class action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements has become a hot topic over the past few years since the National Labor
Relations Board (“Board”), which administers the NLRA, and the courts have largely
split on whether the right to pursue a class action is a substantive right under the NLRA,
as opposed to a mere procedural right that can be waived through agreement. This is an
especially important issue to low-wage workers because if class action waivers are upheld
in arbitration agreements, many low-wage workers, if not all, will be foreclosed from
bringing claims regarding employer violations. This preclusion is primarily due to the fact
that litigation costs often do not justify workers bringing these relatively low value claims
on an individual basis. This Note examines how class actions comport with the
substantive purpose of the NLRA and discusses the recent decisions of the Board and the
courts regarding class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements. This Note
will also offer a few potential resolutions.

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.A. in English,
2011, Sonoma State University. I would like to thank the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for all of
their work on this Note. I would also like to thank my parents and my sisters, who have all been
incredibly supportive of me over the years. This Note is dedicated to my former coworkers, many of
whom I worked with for eight years or more. They have inspired me to support the employment rights
of low-wage workers.
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Introduction
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or
“Act”) in 1935 as a means of alleviating the industrial strife of the Great
1
Depression. Corporate monopolies and employer exploitation caused
poor wages and working conditions, which eventually led to employee
2
unrest. At a time when the country was experiencing economic instability
and the worst outbreak of strikes in decades, Congress sought to address
the industrial strife by leveling the playing field between employee and
3
employer. Thus, the NLRA attempts to divert labor distress away from
disruptive forms of employee activities, such as strikes, by giving
4
employees more bargaining power through collective bargaining rights.
Accordingly, § 7 of the NLRA (“§ 7”) guarantees employees the right to
“form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
1. See Jonathan Fox Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Comparative Analysis of the National
Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Hope for the NLRA’s Future, 13 N.Y.C.
L. Rev. 107, 107 (2009).
2. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the
National Labor Relations Act, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 921 (1993).
3. See Laura J. Cooper, Letting the Puppets Speak: Employee Voice in the Legislative History of
the Wagner Act, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 837, 841 (2011).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016).
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protection” (“§ 7 rights”). The Act prohibits employers from interfering
6
with an employee’s exercise of her § 7 rights.
Under § 7, the right to “form, join, or assist labor organizations”
7
clearly protects union organizing and employee affiliation with unions.
Effectively, an employer cannot act in a way that would discourage
employees from attempting to form a union, from participating in a union,
8
or from associating with a union. Since the enactment of the NLRA,
unions have been the primary means through which workers exercise
their § 7 rights, and indeed the NLRA “envisions unions’ fundamental
mission to be improving wages and other working conditions and standing
9
with and supporting workers.” Unions are the most recognizable tool
employees have to collectively advocate for fair working conditions,
10
including wages, and union activity is explicitly protected by § 7. Without
unions, employees lack a clear institution through which they can
11
collectively bargain for fair working conditions. Thus, some scholars
believe that the decline of unions and other labor organizations over the
12
past few decades explains the increase in hourly wage inequality.
The decline in unions has led to a focus on the ambiguous meaning
of the § 7 catchall“concerted activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid
13
or protection” as workers are forced to find other protected § 7 means
to address their workplace grievances. In response to the need to clarify
the § 7 catchall, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized employees’ § 7
right “to improve working conditions through resort to administrative
14
and judicial forums . . . .” The Supreme Court explained,
Congress knew well enough that labor’s cause often is advanced on
fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within
the immediate employment context. It recognized this fact by
choosing, as the language of [§ 7] makes clear, to protect concerted

5. Id. § 157.
6. Id. § 158(a)(1).
7. Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L.
223, 241 (2005).
8. See Michael P. Spellman & Jeffrey D. Slanker, Social Media, At-Will Employment, and
Internal Investigations: The Ever-Expanding Reach of the National Labor Relations Board to Union
and Non-Union Workplaces, 32 Trial Advoc. Q. 36, 38 (2013).
9. Dannin, supra note 7, at 230.
10. Id. at 241.
11. See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality,
76 Am. Soc. Rev. 513, 517 (2011).
12. See generally Abraham L. Gitlow, Ebb and Flow in America’s Trade Unions: The Present
Prospect, 63 Lab. L.J. 123 (2012) (focusing on the history and development of the trade union
movement in the United States following World War II); CCH Human Resource Compliance
Library, Unions: Impact of Union Decline on Wage Inequality ¶ 94,427 (2015), 2012 WL 5470150.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2016).
14. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978).
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activities for the somewhat broader purpose of “mutual aid or
15
protection.”

Thus, the Supreme Court found that the § 7 catchall generally included
collective legal action when such action was for the purpose of improving
working conditions.
While the Supreme Court has suggested that § 7 protects legal
collective activity generally, the Court has not spoken on the precise
issue of whether pursuing a class action is a protected § 7 activity. The
issue of whether class actions are a protected § 7 activity has become
significant in the employment context because of the recent increase in
16
class action waivers contained in employment arbitration agreements.
Importantly, the Supreme Court has found that substantive employment
rights cannot be waived in an arbitration agreement. As a result, whether
[pursuit of a] class action is a substantive right under the NLRA, as opposed
to a mere procedural right as indicated by the Federal Rules of Civil
17
Procedure, can have a considerable impact on employee rights. When
an employee enters into an arbitration agreement with an employer, she
is agreeing to arbitrate any legal claims covered by the agreement, rather
18
than filing a lawsuit in court. The parties to an arbitration agreement
can tailor many of the terms of the agreement, including what legal
19
claims will be arbitrated. These agreements are often mandatory in the
sense that the employee must consent to the arbitration agreement as a
20
condition of employment. When an arbitration agreement contains a
provision that prohibits employees from arbitrating their claims as a
21
class, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, courts tend to
22
refer to these types of provisions as a class action waiver. Some
provisions also prohibit collective action. The significant difference
between a class action and a collective action is that in a collective action,
individuals must affirmatively give their consent before becoming a part
of the class and being bound by any court judgment in favor of the
23
collective. In a class action, all similarly situated employees are

15. Id. at 565.
16. Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That Bar Class
Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1103, 1125–26.
17. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
18. See Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration
Agreements, with Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 665, 665 (2010).
19. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008); see also American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (finding that 9 U.S.C. § 2 reflects the principle
that arbitration is a matter of contract and that courts must enforce the terms the parties themselves
have agreed on).
20. Li, supra note 18, at 665.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
22. Li, supra note 18, at 700–01.
23. 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2:16 (11th ed. 2014), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2014).
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24

automatically a part of the class. This Note will focus mainly on class
actions and class action waivers because the courts and the National
Labor Relations Board (“Board”) has mainly focused on class actions in
determining whether these waivers are valid in arbitration agreements.
The Board is the federal agency that investigates and resolves
25
complaints under the NLRA. Per this authority, the Board has found
26
that pursuing a class action is a substantive right under § 7. Since
substantive rights cannot be waived through agreement according to
Supreme Court jurisprudence, § 7 rights cannot be waived through
27
arbitration agreements. In coming to this conclusion, the Board relied
on the unique nature of the NLRA in providing substantive collective rights,
as opposed to the individual rights established by other employment
28
statutes. The courts, on the other hand, have largely held that pursuing
a class action is a procedural right because it is codified in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that arbitration agreements with class action
waivers must be upheld under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
29
which establishes that arbitration agreements are generally enforceable.
The issue of class action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court. Any decisions
by the Supreme Court on the issue will be binding on the NLRB and the
30
courts. Until then, the Board and the courts are free to diverge from
one another on the issue, leaving the collective rights of employees in a
31
state of uncertainty. The stakes are particularly high for low-wage
32
workers, who often have legitimate claims with low, individual value.
Employees, and particularly low-wage workers, struggle to bring claims
on their own because of litigation costs, lack of financial resources, and
33
fear of retaliation from employers. Thus, courts have recognized the
34
importance of class actions as a sound option for these employees. This
is most clear in the context of wage and hour litigation where claims are
35
usually of low value.
In response to a surge in employee class actions, employers have
increasingly adopted arbitration agreements containing class and
24. Id.
25. Who We Are, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
26. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012).
27. Id. at *12; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
28. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 54654, at *12 (Oct. 28, 2014).
29. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2014).
30. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1107–08 (explaining that a worker is classified as low wage when she
earns on average $27,000 or less per year while working at least thirty hours a week).
33. Id. at 1118–20.
34. Id. at 1115.
35. Id. at 1116.
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36

collective action waivers. Part I of this Note outlines how low-wage
workers are particularly affected by these arbitration provisions with
class action waivers, especially in the wage and hour context. This Part
further explains how class actions help carry out Congress’ goals under
the NLRA by preventing industrial strife through a level playing field
between employers and low-wage workers. Part II examines recent court
decisions dealing with the issue of class action waivers in employment
arbitration agreements and argues that these decisions have set a
dangerous precedent by restricting an employee’s § 7 rights in two ways.
First, these decisions unjustifiably narrow the definition of “concerted
activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection” under the Act by
determining that pursuit of class actions is not a substantive right under
the NLRA, setting the stage for further limitations on § 7 rights. Second,
these decisions indicate that the FAA can render an employee’s § 7
rights meaningless because these decisions have indicated that
substantive § 7 rights can be waived through arbitration agreements. In
Part III, this Note will present proposals address the problems that
recent court decisions have relied on in upholding class action waivers in
the employment context. First, the Supreme Court, should it decide this
issue in the future, should find that the right to pursue class actions is a
substantive right under § 7. Such a holding is consistent with the
substantive nature of the NLRA and will preclude the narrowing of § 7
rights, while avoiding conflict with the FAA. Alternatively, a narrow
amendment to the FAA explicitly prohibiting waiver in an agreement of
the right to class actions should be considered in order to ensure that
low-wage workers will be legally protected against workplace
exploitation. Without these fixes, class action waivers will leave low-wage
workers largely unprotected against employer exploitation, as they will
effectively be precluded from seeking legal redress for many employer
violations.
I. Impact of Class Action Waivers on Low-Wage Workers
This Note will first show that employer violations against low-wage
workers are widespread and that class actions have helped many of these
workers reclaim their employment rights. Furthermore, the Note will
demonstrate that class actions help support the purpose of the NLRA by
examining how class action waivers financially bar low-wage workers
from addressing employer violations and promote other, more disruptive
means of redress.

36. Joane Deschenaux, Appeals Court Rejects NLRB Conclusion That Class-Action Waivers Violate
Labor Law, Soc’y for Hum. Resource Mgmt. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/
federalresources/pages/appeals-court-rejects-nlrb-class-action-waivers-decision.aspx.
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Recent studies have shown that the employment rights of low-wage
workers are frequently violated. For example, a 2013 Bay Area study of
500 low-wage workers showed that almost all of the workers had been
37
denied a rest or meal break at one time during their working life. More
than a third of them had been denied sick leave and about half of the
38
workers had work-related illnesses or injuries. A majority of the
workers had experienced verbal abuse or degrading treatment at some
point, with more than a quarter of women reporting experiences of
39
sexual harassment in the workplace. This illustration is consistent with
“an emerging body of evidence suggest[ing] that the systematic violation
of employment and labor laws is common in a number of low-wage
40
industries.” Common violations include retaliation for worker complaints,
41
unsafe working conditions, and avoidance of worker’s compensation.
Evidence indicates that wage and hour violations tend to be the
most prevalent rights violations amongst employers of low-wage
42
workers. The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) remains the primary
43
protection for workers against wage theft. The FLSA establishes,
among other employee rights, a right to overtime pay for work exceeding
44
forty hours in a week. Claims by workers that their employers failed to
pay them correctly have quadrupled over the last decade, and the
45
majority of wage and hour litigation claims are filed under the FLSA.
Thus, the recent studies on wage theft, coupled with the increase in
FLSA litigation, indicate that wage theft is an epidemic among low-wage
workers.
Studies show that wage theft is not restricted to a few companies or
industries. In 2009, a survey of 4387 low-wage workers across a variety of
industries working for large and small companies within three major U.S.
cities found that seventy-six percent of full-time workers faced unpaid or
underpaid overtime and twenty-six percent reported being paid less than
46
minimum wage. It also found an overall wage theft of fifteen percent of
47
the earnings of all of the workers surveyed. In 2010, a San Francisco-

37. Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An
Empirical Analysis, 89 Ind. L.J. 1069, 1085 n.66 (2014).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Annette Bernhardt et al., Employers Gone Rogue: Explaining Industry Variation in Violations
of Workplace Laws, 66 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 808, 809 (2013).
41. Id.
42. Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine
Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 727, 735–36 (2010); see also Rosemary
Sage Jones, The FLSA Wage and Hour Epidemic, 69 Advocate 70 (2014).
43. 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2016).
44. Id. § 207.
45. Ruan, supra note 42, at 735; see also Jones, supra note 42.
46. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1110.
47. Id.
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based survey found that fifty percent of Chinatown workers earn less
48
than minimum wage. In New York City in 2012, thirty percent of 436
retail workers interviewed reported that they worked more than forty
49
hours a week without being paid overtime. With these statistics, it is
evident that wage and hour violation is a systemic problem that likely
cannot be addressed by those few individuals that have the financial
resources to bring claims on their own. Thus, class action is an important
tool for combatting widespread employee exploitation since it allows
individual employees to pool their resources for one case.
Recent lawsuits show that class actions have been the only way
through which workers have been able to significantly address wage
violations occurring across industries. Workers in construction, garment
factories, nursing homes, agriculture, poultry processing, and restaurants
have all suffered extensive and systemic wage theft, and studies indicate
that “billions of dollars in wages are being illegally stolen from millions
50
of workers each and every year.” The vast number of recent wage theft
claims brought by low-wage workers from these industries shows that
they are particularly affected by wage theft compared to other workers.
For example, “Wal-Mart . . . paid $352 million dollars to settle sixty-three
51
unpaid wages lawsuits in forty-two states . . . .” Another FLSA
collective action regarding misappropriation of servers’ tips and a failure
to pay overtime at a restaurant chain “settled for $800,000 after sixty-five
52
servers opted in to the lawsuit in a case.” Similarly, employees of a car
wash won a lawsuit alleging that their employer paid them less than
minimum wage, did not give them adequate breaks, and even paid some
53
workers only in tips.
These cases and surveys show that wage theft is a particularly
serious problem affecting low-wage workers, and that class actions have
been, and should continue to be, the primary tool workers use to
alleviate this problem.
A. Class Action Waivers and the Purpose of the NLRA
Class action waivers undermine the purpose of the NLRA in two
ways. First, class action waivers leave low-wage workers with almost no
bargaining power. The collective rights established by the NLRA gave
employees more bargaining power through protected means of addressing
workplace grievances. Class actions serve this purpose by protecting
employees from employer exploitation. Class action waivers force
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Ruan, supra note 42, at 737 (quoting Kim Bobo, Wage Theft in America 6 (2009)).
Ruan, supra note 16, at 1109–10.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
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workers to address workplace grievances individually and without the
shield of anonymity, thus allowing employers to exploit these
vulnerabilities. Second, with decreasing access to union protection and
the high costs of litigation, the next most likely alternative is disruptive
collective action, which the NLRA specifically aims to prevent.
The minimal bargaining power of unskilled, low-wage workers
across industries reflects their vulnerability in the face of wage theft and
other opportunities for employers to exploit them. Other common
examples of exploitation include:
[C]ashiers at retail chains that are misclassified as “assistant managers”
and lose thousands in unpaid overtime; restaurant workers who have
their tips “reallocated” to owners and management; truck drivers who
have their hours shaved; car wash workers paid below minimum wage;
temporary staffing agency workers who lose premium overtime pay
54
through creative time keeping.

These examples show that there are some common vulnerabilities
shared among low-wage workers in different industries. Thus, the
protection of class actions can address the exploitation of employees in a
variety of occupations.
There are a number of factors that leave low-wage workers with
little bargaining power, particularly in the wage theft context. In addition
to the financial barrier to individual wage and hour litigation, lack of
knowledge and fear of retaliation are also concerns for low-wage
workers. Low-wage workers, who are often low-skilled workers and atwill employees, are less likely to challenge workplace violations in times
of high unemployment because many employers consider them easily
55
replaceable. Unchallenged violations are especially prevalent in industries
where the low-wage workers are immigrants with limited English
proficiency, have minimal familiarity with their legal rights, or are fearful
56
and lack motivation based on their immigrant status. Furthermore,
many low-wage workers remain unaware that their employers have
57
violated their legal rights until they are informed of the violations. Thus,
many low-wage workers will be discouraged from claiming wage and
hour violations on an individual basis because they fear or anticipate
retaliation from the employer who can terminate or discipline employees
at will or who can expose their immigration status. Class and collective
actions can help address these vulnerabilities.

54. Id. at 1109.
55. CCH Human Resource Compliance Library, Employee Relations: Causes of Turnover
¶ 46,417, 2012 WL 5934978; Yungsuhn Park, The Immigrant Workers Union: Challenges Facing LowWage Immigrant Workers in Los Angeles, 12 Asian L.J. 67, 98–99 (2005).
56. See Llezlie Green Coleman, Procedural Hurdles and Thwarted Efficiency: Immigration Relief
in Wage and Hour Collective Actions, 16 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (2013).
57. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1121.
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There are two separate procedures through which workers can
collectively file claims, depending on whether their claims fall under the
FLSA. Section 216(b) of the FLSA, which deals specifically with wage
and hour violations, provides that an action to recover for violations of
the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer . . . by any one or
more employees for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other
58
employees similarly situated.” While the FLSA authorizes collective
legal action specifically for wage and hour claims, Federal Rule of Civil
59
Procedure 23 governs class actions generally. Class actions, therefore,
can be used for a broader range of employment claims.
Collective actions and class actions have many similar protections
for low-wage workers against employer exploitation, as will be discussed
in this Part, but there is one significant difference that makes Rule 23
class actions superior to collective actions for low-wage workers. Under
Rule 23, putative class members must opt out in order to be removed
from each case, meaning that all employees that fit the requirements of
the class are automatically members of the class until they affirmatively
60
decline this inclusion. Rule 23 thus alleviates the fear of employer
retaliation for bringing a claim because it only requires a few named
plaintiffs, usually those who initiate the claim, to represent the class as
61
the plaintiffs in the case. In comparison, under § 216(b), workers, once
notified of the claim and how to join it, must opt in by filing a written
consent, thus providing little protection against fear of retaliation
because the employer can readily identify the individual and her
62
association with the claim as listed on the face of the claim. Both rules,
63
however, require notice of the suit to similarly situated employees.
Notice provides workers with information regarding their wage rights
and the potential violations of these rights, and also encourages them to
64
seek legal counsel. Thus, many workers who are vulnerable to employer
exploitation because they are unaware of their rights or violations
thereof have increased protection through FLSA collective actions and
through Rule 23 class actions. All it takes is one victim aware of the
employer violations to bring a lawsuit on behalf of those low-wage
65
workers similarly wronged. Because class actions address many of the
vulnerabilities of low-wage workers in the employment context through
the opt-out mechanism, it serves an important purpose of the NLRA by
58. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2016).
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
62. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2016).
63. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
64. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1121–22.
65. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,
90 Or. L. Rev. 703, 722 (2012).
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helping to equalize the bargaining power between employer and
employee.
Another obstacle for low-wage workers is the financial barrier to
wage and hour litigation. As noted above, a worker is classified as lowwage when she earns on average $27,000 or less per year while working
at least thirty hours per week, and lost wages are often important to
66
these individual workers in order to meet the cost of living. However,
attorneys usually do not take on individual wage and hour cases because
the costs and resources of litigation are unjustified by the relatively
minimal amount of damages, and low-wage workers generally cannot
67
afford to pay for expensive litigation costs out of pocket. Effectively,
this means that if low-wage workers are always required to bring their
wage and hour claims on an individual basis, the vast majority will not
have their claims heard and will not receive the wages withheld from
them. In comparison, the ability to aggregate claims through class actions
eliminates the financial barrier and ultimately allows low-wage workers
to litigate their wage and hour claims.
Beyond equalizing bargaining power, the NLRA also seeks to
68
safeguard commerce from disruptions such as strikes and picketing. A
primary purpose of the NLRA is to channel industrial strife into orderly
collective bargaining, and class action waivers undermine this purpose
because bargaining power and industrial strife are correlative: “[T]he
policy justification of conferring bargaining power on employees is to
prevent strikes and industrial unrest that may in turn decrease wages and
purchasing power, which ultimately may disrupt the market for goods in
69
interstate commerce.” Thus, Congress has found that equality of
bargaining power through collective rights is necessary to prevent
aggravation of economic depression and instability and to ensure the free
70
flow of interstate commerce.
The Board has said that “[b]locking this channel [of class actions]
would only push employees toward other, more disruptive forms of
71
concerted activity.” As discussed above in Part I.B, class actions help to
equalize the bargaining power between low-wage workers and their
employers. In light of the decline in unions, which evidence shows has

66. See Ruan, supra note 16, at 1107–08.
67. Id. at 1118–19.
68. 22 Ill. Practice, The Law of Medical Practice in Illinois § 37:2 (3d ed. 2015), Westlaw
(database updated Feb. 2015); Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights,
71 Va. L. Rev. 685, 686 (1985).
69. Michael C. Duff, What Brady v. N.F.L. Teaches About the Devolution of Labor Law, 52
Washburn L.J. 429, 470 (2013).
70. Comparison of S. 2926 and S. 1958, at 15 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong., Legislative History of the National
Labor Relations Act, 1935, at 1338 (1985).
71. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 54654, at *10 (Oct. 28, 2014).
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72

already led to an increase in wage inequality, and an increase in class
73
action waivers in arbitration agreements, low-wage workers will
continue to have low bargaining power and be vulnerable to depressed
wages. Without access to an orderly forum to address their grievances,
any current employee unrest will likely divert to more disruptive forms
of collective activity—such as strikes—subverting the goal of the NLRA
to “eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
74
flow of commerce.”
Ultimately, class action waivers will leave many workers vulnerable
to exploitation because of their low bargaining power, directly undermining
a primary purpose of the NLRA to equalize bargaining power. The
inequality in bargaining power then promotes the use of disruptive forms
of employee collective activity, as employees seeking to combat
workplace violations have limited tools of redress beyond class actions.
Thus, if class action waivers are found to be valid in employment
arbitration agreements, the goals of the NLRA could become futile.
II. The Current Tug-of-War over Class Action Waivers in
Employment Arbitration Agreements
This Part addresses the divergence between the courts and the
Board on the issue of enforceability of class action waivers in employment
arbitration agreements and examines the key arguments of each in
rendering conflicting opinions. While neither the Board nor the courts
are bound by the decisions of the other, each tends to address the
arguments of the other since § 7 rights claims often go through the hands
of both.
The process of addressing employer violations often begins when an
75
employee files a claim against the employer in state or federal court.
However, if there is an arbitration agreement with a class action waiver,
the ability of low-wage workers to proceed with these claims depends
largely on whether a court will enforce the class action waiver and force
76
individual arbitration. In comparison to the claims of individual
employment rights violations brought in courts, an employee who
believes her employer has infringed on her § 7 rights has the option of
filing an unfair labor practices claim with the Board, which has exclusive
77
jurisdiction over such claims. Employees have thus filed unfair labor
practice claims on the basis that class action waivers infringe upon their

72. See Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 513.
73. Ruan, supra note 16, at 1125–26.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016).
75. Jones, supra note 42, at 74.
76. See infra Part II.B.
77. Laura L. Mall, Practical Implications of Murphy Oil on Employee Waivers: An Ecological
Disaster or a Dissenter’s Pipeline to Freedom?, 89 Fla. Bus. J. 38, 38 (2015).
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§ 7 rights. Board decisions may be appealed to a court of appeals, but
neither the Board nor the courts are bound by the decisions of the other
on the issue of unfair labor practice claims, including the claim that class
78
action waivers violate § 7. However, the courts of appeals are required
to defer to the Board’s interpretation of § 7 if such interpretation has a
79
reasonable basis in law. The court of appeals and the Board are bound
by the decisions of the Supreme Court, should the Supreme Court ever
80
decide the issue.
The enforceability of class action waivers is increasingly significant
because evidence indicates that arbitration agreements in employment
contracts are on the rise and have been for several years: “[T]he number
of employees covered by employment arbitration plans administered by
the American Arbitration Association increased from 3 million
81
employees in 1997 to 6 million in 2001.” In 2008, it was estimated that
about fifteen percent to twenty-five percent of employers nationally had
82
adopted mandatory arbitration procedures. Thus, a significant number
of low-wage workers must adhere to the provisions of employment
arbitration agreements, and the use of class action waivers in these
83
arbitration agreements is already fairly common. This increase in
arbitration agreements in employment contracts threatens the ability of
many low-wage workers to have their wage, hour, and other low-value
claims heard if class action waivers in these agreements are held to be
enforceable.
The enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements
is still uncertain because while some courts have found them
unenforceable, most courts have upheld such provisions in employment
arbitration agreements. The few courts that have found class action
waivers in arbitration agreements unenforceable have done so on the
basis of unconscionability or public policy, because such a provision
84
operates solely to the advantage of the employer. However, the
majority of courts deciding this precise issue have found that class action
waivers are valid in employment arbitration agreements, primarily for
78. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
79. 12 Emp’t Coordinator Labor Relations § 52:45, Deference Given to NLRB’s Interpretations
of Law, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2016).
80. Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 65, 90 (2003).
81. Stacey L. Pine, Employment Arbitration Agreements and the Future of Class-Action Waivers,
4 Am. U. Lab. & Emp. L.F. 1, 11 (2014).
82. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the
Sound and Fury?, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 405, 411 (2007).
83. Christopher T. Vrountas, Class Action Waivers and Arbitration Agreements Are Enforceable,
for Now, SES Legal Educ. Blog (June 2, 2014), http://www.sterlingeducation.com/the-sterling-blog/
bid/101658/Class-Action-Waivers-and-Arbitration-Agreements-Are-Enforceable-For-Now.
84. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003); Gentry v. Super. Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 443, 452 (2007).
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two reasons: (1) a class action is not a substantive right under the NLRA,
rather it is a procedural right and thus can be waived; and (2) the FAA
dictates that an arbitration agreement must be enforced to its terms, even
in an employment context where the employer has significantly more
85
bargaining power. The Board, on the other hand, has consistently struck
down class action waivers in arbitration agreements as violations of
86
employees’ § 7 rights. This Note argues that the Board is correct
because the courts’ decisions have provided little basis for narrowing
employees’ § 7 rights by excluding class actions from these rights.
Furthermore, because the Board has reasonably interpreted § 7 to
include the right to pursue a class action, the courts should defer to this
interpretation.
A. Interpretation of the Section 7 Catchall
The Board and the Supreme Court have often interpreted the § 7
catchall broadly in order to ensure that employees can maintain
87
bargaining power through collective activity in various workplaces. The
right to engage in “concerted activities . . . for the purpose of mutual aid
or other protection” under § 7 thus acts as a catchall for collective
88
activity. The Board and the courts have analyzed the catchall as
containing two separate elements: (1) concerted activity; and (2) mutual
89
aid or protection. Both elements must be established in order for the
90
employee activity to constitute a protected § 7 activity. This Part will
examine the wide boundaries established by the Supreme Court for both
elements.
The Supreme Court has established a broad reading of “concerted
activity” under § 7, explaining that “[t]here is no indication that Congress
intended to limit this protection to situations in which an employee’s
activity and that of [] fellow employees combine with one another in any

85. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2013); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F.
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA,
Inc., No. 4:11-cv-520-DPM, 2012 WL 3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners
Residential, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr.
3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012).
86. Brinker Int’l Payroll Co., 27-CA-110765, 2014 WL 2547547 (N.L.R.B. June 4, 2014); Flyte
Tyme Worldwide, 04-CA-115437, 2014 WL 2507633 (N.L.R.B. June 3, 2014); Fairfield Imports, LLC,
20-CA-035259, 2014 WL 2507632 (N.L.R.B. June 3, 2014); Labor Ready Sw., Inc., 31-CA-072914, 2014
WL 1692778 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 29, 2014).
87. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 (1978).
88. Id. at 558.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 564–66; see also Michael D. Schwartz, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The
False Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2945, 2963 (2013).
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91

particular way.” An individual employee can undertake “concerted
activity” when she acts as a representative for at least one other
92
employee or when she intends to induce group activity. Protected § 7
concerted activity has included employees acting alone to vindicate rights
statutorily provided to all employees and an individual bringing a group
93
complaint to the attention of management.
The definition of “mutual aid or protection” is similarly broad. The
Supreme Court has found that an employee acts for mutual aid or
protection when she seeks to improve the terms and conditions of
94
employment. This includes action taken to improve working conditions
“in administrative and judicial forums,” such as when employees initiate
95
appeals to legislators or agencies and file judicial actions. Employees
who join in a lawsuit together against their employer are engaging in
protected § 7 activity when the lawsuit seeks to address employer actions
96
that have been detrimental to their working conditions. The Court has
found that the broad language of “mutual aid or protection” indicated
that Congress intended to protect a wide variety of employee concerted
activities because it knew that labor disputes were not always best
97
resolved in the immediate employment context. The Court has held that
arbitrarily limiting the employee actions that constitute protected § 7
rights would “frustrate the policy of the [NLRA] to protect the right of
98
workers to act together to better their working conditions.” Section 7
thus protects different forms of collective action—including collective
legal action—which tend to advance and protect employee rights and
federal labor policy.
B. Class Actions as a Substantive Section 7 Right
This Part addresses Supreme Court precedent and Board decisions
to argue that pursuit of a class action is a substantive § 7 right. In D.R.
Horton, Inc., the Board first addressed the issue of whether a class action
99
prohibition in an arbitration agreement violated § 7. This case involved
a typical employment arbitration agreement that prohibited employees
from pursuing class actions and that required employees to sign the

91. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984).
92. Id. at 831.
93. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975); Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).
94. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565.
95. Id. at 566; Michael D. Schwartz, Note, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The False
Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2945, 2965 (2013).
96. See Health Enters. of Am., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 214 (1986); Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp.,
221 N.L.R.B. 364 (1975).
97. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565.
98. Id. at 567 (quoting NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)).
99. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012).
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100

agreement as a condition of employment. As in many cases where an
employer infringes on an employee’s § 7 rights, the employee in this case
filed an unfair labor practice claim with the Board when his employer
101
refused to submit to class arbitration. For the first time, the Board
applied § 7 to class actions and interpreted it as including the right to
102
pursue class action. This Part examines the Board’s interpretation and
argues that the interpretation of class action as a substantive § 7 right is
reasonable and should thus be deferred to by the courts.
In finding that pursuing a class action is a substantive § 7 right, the
Board relied heavily on precedent that strongly favors including
103
collective legal action as a protected concerted activity under § 7. The
Board relied on Supreme Court precedent that substantive rights cannot
be contractually waived in holding that the class action waiver violated §
104
7. Because of this precedent, the right to pursue a class action cannot
be waived in an arbitration agreement if it is a § 7 right and because an
arbitration agreement is a contract. Beyond this precedent, there is
ample support for the Board’s conclusion that pursuing class actions is a
substantive right under § 7 given the wide boundaries of the § 7 catchall,
as discussed in Part II.A.
Employees’ pursuit of a class action is a collective activity that fits
105
well within the § 7 catchall as defined by the courts and the Board. The
named plaintiffs in class actions act in a representative capacity, a
scenario that the Supreme Court deemed “concerted activity” under
106
§ 7. Class actions also satisfy the “mutual aid or protection” element
when employees in a class action bring suit for an employer’s systemic
107
violations under state and federal employment statutes. Perhaps most
importantly, pursuing a class action is a collective activity that works to
advance federal labor policy as defined by the NLRA. The NLRA
promotes the right of employees to engage in collective activity in order
to combat the inequalities that are often present in the employer108
employee relationship. In the Board’s most recent decision regarding
class action waivers in employment arbitration contracts, Murphy Oil,

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *10.
104. Id. at *12.
105. See cases cited supra note 84.
106. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984) (finding that an employee is engaged in
concerted activity when “the employee acts as a representative of at least one other employee”).
107. Schwartz, supra note 95, at 2966 (“The Board had previously held that a suit filed by multiple
employees is a form of concerted activity, and so it concluded that the same classification should apply
to claims brought on a classwide basis. This is true even if the suit is initiated unilaterally, on behalf of
other employees.”).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016).
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the Board found that there was no basis for excluding collective legal
action, specifically class action, because class action, as a substantive
right, reinforces the primary policy considerations underlying the
109
NLRA. The Board relied on this right in reaching its decision in D.R.
Horton, and courts have reaffirmed this right in many cases that remain
110
good law today.
In comparison, some courts that have addressed the issue of class
action waivers in employment contracts have disagreed with the Board
on the issue of whether class action is a substantive right or a procedural
111
right. These courts have ignored the established judicial precedent
defining what a substantive right is by ignoring the nature of the
substantive rights under the NLRA. For example, in declining to follow
the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton, the Fifth Circuit—the only federal
circuit court to have addressed this issue of class action as a substantive
112
right thus far—found that class action is not a § 7 right. In particular,
the Fifth Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent that found there is
no substantive right to class action under the Age Discrimination
113
Employment Act and the FLSA. This Subpart argues that the Fifth
Circuit and other courts have erroneously relied on cases that dealt with
collective legal action brought under other employment statutes, such as
the FLSA, as precedent supporting the notion that collective legal action
114
is not a substantive right. In Board decisions after D.R. Horton, the
Board explained that while the underlying legal claims involved the
FLSA, it was the NLRA that was the source of the relevant, substantive
115
In comparison, other
right to pursue those claims concertedly.
employment statutes create only individual rights, and under these
statutes, class action is merely a procedure through which these claims
can be brought. The NLRA is unique in that it creates substantive
collective rights. Thus, these courts have failed to address the unique
nature of the NLRA, which is important in determining whether class
action is a substantive right under the NLRA that cannot be waived
through agreement.
Regarding whether a right is substantive or procedural, the Supreme
Court provides: “[t]he most helpful way . . . of defining a substantive

109. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 54654, at *8 (Oct. 28, 2014) (“Indeed,
concerted legal activity would seem, if anything, to be a favored form of concerted activity under the
Act because it would have the least potential for economic disruption, the harm that Congress sought
to prevent in enacting the NLRA, as Section 1 of the Act explains.”).
110. Peter Danysh, Employing the Right Test: The Importance of Restricting AT&T v. Concepcion
to Consumer Adhesion Contracts, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 1433, 1465–66 (2013).
111. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, at *12 (Oct. 28, 2014).
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rule . . . is as a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for
some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency
116
of the litigation process.” For example, collective action under FLSA
§ 216(b) is not a substantive right, but it is a mechanism through which
employees can better ensure fairness and efficiency in the litigation of
wage and hour claims. The purpose of the collective action mechanism of
§ 216(b) is to give plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs
through the pooling of resources. In general, such collective action
mechanisms also promote judicial efficiency by allowing for “resolution
117
in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact.” The substantive
rights of the FLSA, on the other hand, focus on individual rights: “in
passing the FLSA, Congress did not state support for collective action;
rather, its intention was to force employers to compensate workers for
individual violations in wage and hour provisions to ensure workers
earned enough to reinvest in the economy and boost the nation out of
118
the Great Depression.” Thus, in the context of the FLSA, collective
legal action does not serve the statute’s substantive purpose of
establishing employees’ right to fair wages, but rather serves the purpose
of streamlining litigation of these claims.
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)
establishes individual rights and largely follows FLSA § 216(b) by
incorporating the procedures of that provision into its own authorization
119
for collective legal action. The substantive purpose of the ADEA is to
fight age discrimination in the workforce through individual rights to
120
bring age discrimination claims against employers. Like the FLSA,
class and collective actions are mechanisms under the ADEA to ensure
fairness and efficiency in bringing these claims: “The ADEA and the
FLSA provide individuals with a cause of action, including access to a
judicial forum and class action mechanisms, as a means to vindicate their
121
other statutory rights regarding age discrimination and wages.” The
ADEA and FLSA are representative of employment statutes that
establish individual rights and are distinct from the substantive nature of
the NLRA, which establishes collective rights.

116. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 36–37 n.53 (1985) (citing John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth
of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 725 (1974)).
117. Kristin M. Stastny, Eleventh Circuit Treatment of Certification of Collective Actions Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act: A Remedial Statute Without a Remedy?, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 1191, 1203
(2008).
118. Fox Harris, supra note 1, at 107–08.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2016).
120. Colleen Gale Treml, Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department: Pushing Plaintiffs down
the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination Suits, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 995, 995 (1990).
121. Note, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB’s Determination of Substantive
Statutory Rights, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 907, 927 (2015).
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The courts that declined to follow D.R. Horton in finding that
pursuing class actions is not a substantive right under the NLRA have
failed to address the unique nature of the NLRA, and instead have
incorrectly relied on the employment statutes that establish individual
rights. In D.R. Horton, the court explained, “the right allegedly violated
by [D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement] is not the right to be paid the
minimum wage or overtime under the FLSA, but the right to engage in
122
collective action under the NLRA.” The purpose of collective action
under the NLRA, including collective legal action, is to equalize
bargaining power between employees and employers and to ensure
123
industrial stability. As discussed above in Part I, class actions serve this
purpose, in addition to efficiency and fairness purposes. Because class
actions have nonprocedural purposes under the NLRA, pursuing a class
action is a substantive § 7 right. While § 7 does not create a right to be
certified as a class under Rule 23, it creates a substantive right to pursue
class action procedures as a protected “concerted activity” when done for
the mutual aid and benefit of other employees, which includes pursuing
124
claims under other employment statutes. Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not
persuasively explain why pursuing class actions is not a substantive right
when it fits under the broad definition of “concerted activities . . . for
125
other mutual aid and protection.” Upholding the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning, instead of the Board’s decisions to invalidate class action
waivers, would therefore unjustifiably restrict § 7 activity.
C. The Federal Arbitration Act as Applied to Employment
Arbitration Agreements with Class Action Waivers
This Subpart focuses on the courts’ application of the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to class action waivers in employment
arbitration agreements. Many courts have used the liberal federal policy
and Supreme Court precedent encouraging the use of arbitration to
justify upholding class action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements, while ignoring the strong federal policy of protecting
employee rights underlying the NLRA. Such decisions can have dangerous
implications for employee rights because these courts are prioritizing the
goals of the FAA over the goals of the NLRA.
The FAA essentially establishes that an arbitration agreement and
126
all of its terms are generally enforceable. There are only two exceptions
to this rule: The first is the “savings clause” exception, which states that
122. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *10 (Jan. 3, 2012).
123. Id.
124. Id. (“Rule 23 may be a procedural rule, but the Section 7 right to act concertedly by invoking
Rule 23, Section 216(b), or other legal procedures is not.”).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2016).
126. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2016).
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an arbitration agreement is not enforceable “upon such grounds as exist
127
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” The second
exception is satisfied when there is another statute that conflicts and has
128
a clear congressional command that overrides the FAA. The Supreme
Court has read the savings clause exception narrowly, finding that
arbitration agreements will be enforced even when there is a contrary
129
state law. With regard to the second exception, the Supreme Court has
held that the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate a congressional
intent to override the FAA in the text, legislative history, or purpose of the
130
conflicting statute. Overall, the Supreme Court has established “a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” and has traditionally struck
131
down any policy or law that tends to disfavor arbitration.
The Supreme Court’s first decision regarding the enforceability of
class action waivers in arbitration agreements reinforced this liberal
132
federal policy favoring arbitration. However, this case involved class
action waivers in a consumer context, rather than an employment
context. Since the NLRA does not apply to the consumer context, it does
not provide support for class action as an unwaivable substantive right in
the consumer context. In this case, the original plaintiffs, the Concepcions,
entered into a contract with AT&T for the sale and servicing of
133
cellphones. The contract included a provision that required all claims
be brought in arbitration, and the arbitration provision further barred all
134
class and collective actions. After the Concepcions filed a lawsuit
against AT&T for breach of contract, they argued that the arbitration
135
provision was unconscionable because of the class action waiver.
Relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Concepcions, and
found that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because
“AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted
136
for the deterrent effects of class actions.” Effectively, California’s
Discover Bank rule classified most collective arbitration waivers in

127. Id.; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011); D.R. Horton, Inc. v.
NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 358 (5th Cir. 2013).
128. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2016); AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746; D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 358.
129. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
130. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
131. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
132. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
133. Id. at 1744.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1744–45.
136. Id. at 1745.
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137

consumer contracts as unconscionable. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the FAA preempted the California rule establishing that
138
unconscionable contracts are void. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied upon case law establishing that the primary purpose of the
FAA is to encourage arbitration by enforcing arbitration agreements to
139
their terms. Thus, if a state law frustrates this purpose, the FAA
preempts the law. The Court also found that the number of parties
involved and the added procedural requirements placed on the arbitrator
relative to class certification would further frustrate arbitration by
eliminating its advantages, which include informality, speed, and lower
140
cost. Therefore, the Court found the arbitration agreement and its class
action waiver enforceable because the FAA preempted any state law
141
that tended to disfavor arbitration.
Three months after AT&T Mobility, the Board decided D.R.
Horton, which was the first Board decision to address class action
waivers in the employment context. Once the Board determined that the
arbitration agreement violated the NLRA because class action was a
substantive right, as discussed in Part II.A, the Board next considered
142
whether the FAA and the NLRA conflicted on this precise issue. As
the only binding precedent for the Board, the Supreme Court has
established that if there is a conflict between the two statutes, agencies,
such as the Board, are supposed to do their best to accommodate
143
conflicting federal statutes. The Board, relying on this precedent, found
that there was no conflict because the class action “waiver interferes with
substantive statutory rights under the NLRA, and the intent of the FAA
[under Supreme Court precedent] was to leave substantive rights
144
undisturbed.” Thus, because the FAA does not allow the waiver of
substantive rights, it does not conflict with the NLRA if pursuing a class
action is a substantive right. Even if there was a conflict, the Board found
that invalidating class action waivers in the employment context would
represent an appropriate accommodation of the two statutes because the
strong federal policy protecting employees’ rights, as established through
federal statutes like the NLRA, satisfied the FAA’s savings clause
145
exception. In coming to this conclusion, the Board found that the
strong federal policy protecting employees’ right to engage in protected

137. Id.
138. Id. at 1753.
139. Id. at 1750–51.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1753.
142. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *8 (Jan. 3, 2012).
143. Id.; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the
Court, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 53, 72–73.
144. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at *11.
145. Id.
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concerted action would do little to undermine the FAA and its policy to
146
encourage the use of arbitration. The employer’s incentive to use
arbitration for cost and time savings would not be undermined by finding
class action waivers unenforceable in an employment context because
147
employment class actions typically involve only twenty employees. The
efficiency and manageability advantages of arbitration would therefore
remain intact with the typical class action employment arbitration, and
thus the purpose of the FAA to encourage arbitration would not be
148
undermined. Thus, in accommodating the two statutes, the Board
properly considered the purposes of both statutes.
This Note argues that, while the Board has accommodated the two
statutes with a relatively balanced approach, many of the state and
federal courts have given too much weight to the goals of the FAA. A
majority of courts to date have refused to follow D.R. Horton, finding
instead that class action waivers in arbitration agreements are
149
enforceable under the FAA, regardless of context. Four federal circuit
courts of appeals have addressed the issue of arbitration agreements with
150
class action waivers in employment contracts. Three of the four federal
circuit courts, however, provided only conclusory statements or little
explanation in support of the decisions to disregard D.R. Horton. For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, when
declining to follow D.R. Horton in a case involving FLSA claims, stated
that no deference is owed to the Board’s reasoning because it has no
151
experience in interpreting the FAA. It further supported its conclusion
by finding no contrary congressional command in the FLSA overriding
the FAA, but did not explain why the text of the FLSA did not constitute
152
a contrary congressional command. In declining to follow D.R. Horton,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit merely stated that it
153
owed no deference to the reasoning of the Board. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to even address D.R. Horton
because the party opposing enforcement of the arbitration agreement
154
failed to raise the argument until after the parties had briefed. The

146. Id. at *12–13.
147. Id. at *11–12.
148. Id. at *12.
149. See, e.g., Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838–41 (N.D. Cal. 2012); DeLock v.
Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789–91 (E.D. Ark. 2012).
150. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2013); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013).
151. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1054.
152. Id. at 1055.
153. Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 297 n.8.
154. Richards, 744 F.3d at 1075.
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conclusory reasoning of these circuit courts indicate a potentially
dangerous trend in overriding the Board’s authority to define § 7 rights
through the use of arbitration agreements.
The Fifth Circuit provided more explanation for its determination
that the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA in D.R. Horton conflicted
155
with the FAA. The court considered whether the interpretation fit
under either of the two exceptions to the general FAA rule that an
156
arbitration agreement must be enforced to its terms. The court found
that the Board had not satisfied the savings clause exception because
class arbitration would discourage employers from pursuing arbitration
given the added costs, time, and formality with having multiple plaintiffs,
157
thereby frustrating the policy of the FAA. The court held that the
second exception was also not satisfied by the NLRA because the party
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving a congressional
command and that all doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration
158
because federal policy favors arbitration. The court held that the
general language of the NLRA was insufficient to constitute a contrary
159
congressional command. In particular, the court found that the lack of
more specific words related to the issue, such as “arbitration” or “class
action,” undermined the assertion that the NLRA contained a clear
contrary congressional command. Therefore, the court found that the
arbitration agreement must be enforced to its terms, including the class
160
action waiver.
In contrast, the Board came to different conclusions than that of the
Fifth Circuit regarding the accommodation of the two statutes. The
Board analyzed the flaws in the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in its most
recent decision regarding class action waivers in employment arbitration
161
agreements, Murphy Oil. First, the Board found that invalidating
arbitration agreements with class action waivers would not undermine
the FAA because the NLRA does not legally conflict with the FAA,
given the Supreme Court precedent establishing that the FAA does not
162
allow the waiver of substantive rights. Accordingly, the Board found
that class action waivers in an employment arbitration agreement fall
under the savings clause exception of the FAA because these agreements
restrict employees’ ability to partake in nondisruptive collective activity
for the purpose of bettering the workplace, and precedent clearly finds

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 362.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, at *9 (Oct. 28, 2014).
Id.
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163

such agreements unlawful. The Board found that the second exception,
the requirement of a contrary congressional command, was also met
because the NLRA’s broad language clearly authorizes concerted legal
164
activity, which is supported by Supreme Court precedent.
Alternatively, the Board pointed out that if the two statutes do
conflict, agencies are supposed to try and accommodate conflicting
165
federal statutes instead of relying on the preemption doctrine. The
Board’s finding on this point is consistent with Supreme Court
166
precedent. The Board found that the federal circuit courts, specifically
the Fifth Circuit, did not properly accommodate the two statutes because
167
they gave too much weight to the FAA and its policies. In particular,
the courts merely relied on AT&T Mobility and the liberal federal policy
favoring the FAA and arbitration in finding that the NLRA is required
168
to yield to the FAA. However, the Board held that AT&T Mobility
does not apply here because the case involved accommodation of two
federal statutes, not preemption of state law, which was the issue in
AT&T Mobility. Furthermore, the Board pointed out that the Supreme
169
Court has made clear that every federal statute has limits, so a liberal
federal policy does not mean the FAA is limitless. Because the courts did
not provide justification beyond the liberal policy favoring arbitration for
finding that the FAA trumped the NLRA in this case, “the majority
never persuasively . . . explained why, if there is tension between the
NLRA and the FAA, it is the FAA that should trump the NLRA, rather
170
than the reverse.” The Board seemed to imply that the lack of
explanation indicated an improper presumption of the courts that the
FAA held more importance than the NLRA. Such a presumption
supports the argument that these decisions have dangerous implications
for § 7 rights since the goal of the FAA, that of encouraging arbitration,
may be given more weight in an accommodation than the goal of the
NLRA to provide for collective employee rights.
Furthermore, the issue in question, collective legal action, implicates
the NLRA more than it does the FAA because “the NLRA includes
express language protecting the rights of employees to engage in
concerted action whereas the FAA contains no language in the FAA
171
prohibiting collective litigation.” Thus, the Board indicated that the

163. Id.; Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940).
164. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. at *9.
165. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
166. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *8 (Jan. 3, 2012).
167. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. at *12.
168. Id.
169. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (finding that “no legislation pursues
its purposes at all costs”).
170. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 993 F. Supp. 2d 940, 946 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
171. Id.
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policies of the NLRA should have received more weight in the
accommodation of the two statutes because of its explicit policy to
provide collective rights is directly affected.
Additionally, the Board found that the Fifth Circuit gave too much
weight to the FAA because invalidating arbitration agreements with
class action waivers would not “frustrate” the primary purpose of the
172
FAA to encourage arbitration. Employers still have incentive to pursue
arbitration if class action waivers are invalidated. With arbitration,
employers can avoid juries and the unpredictability of trial. Employers
can also use “expert arbitrators less likely than juries to favor
employees, . . . limited discovery, and . . . the ‘repeat player’ dynamics
created by the reality that employers, but not so often employees, will
173
return to the arbitral forum in future workplace disputes.” Thus, the
invalidation of class action waivers would not significantly frustrate the
purpose of the FAA to promote the use of arbitration because employers
are likely to still favor arbitration over litigation. Additionally, as
discussed in Part I, upholding class action waivers would severely
frustrate the purpose of the NLRA. As a true accommodation weighs the
impact of the issue on the competing goals of the conflicting statutes, the
Fifth Circuit’s decision does not reflect a proper accommodation of the
NLRA and the FAA since the impact on the FAA is minimal in
comparison to the impact on the NLRA.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the FAA to the
NLRA should not be followed because it presents an opportunity for
employers to challenge the Board’s interpretation of potential § 7
employee collective activities that have yet to be established as a § 7 right
through Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit’s decision found
that the Board’s interpretation of class action as a § 7 activity conflicts
with the FAA because it discourages the use of arbitration, and that any
such discouragement dictates enforcement of arbitration agreements to
174
its terms. Given that class action waivers severely frustrate the NLRA’s
policies, the Fifth Circuit indicated that the goal of the FAA, to enforce
arbitration agreements to its terms, prevails over the goal of the NLRA,
to protect collective activity and prevent industrial strife. Thus, under the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis, the Board’s interpretation of an employee
collective activity will be given little or no weight in an accommodation
of the two statutes when such an activity might discourage arbitration.
Only the well-established § 7 rights, such as collective bargaining and
union organizing, are presumably safe from this conflict, since
substantive rights cannot be waived. But whenever there is an issue over
172. Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 525–26.
173. Henry H. Drummonds, Avoiding the “Plague” of Class Action/Representative Action Wage
and Hour Suits, 65 Labor L.J. 76, 76 (2014).
174. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2013).
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whether a collective activity is a § 7 right, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning
opens the door to further challenges to the authority of the Board in
interpreting § 7 rights through the application of the FAA.
Perhaps even more dangerous than the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning
behind its holding that class action is not a § 7 right is the finding by some
courts that even when pursuing a class action is a § 7 right, it can be
waived in an arbitration agreement. Several courts have found that even
when class action is considered a substantive right under § 7, class action
175
waivers in arbitration agreements should still be upheld. These courts
applied similar reasoning to the Fifth Circuit in concluding that the FAA
prevails over the NLRA. The courts first found that there was a conflict
between the FAA and the NLRA because compelling class actions
conflicts with the FAA’s purpose to enforce arbitration agreements to
176
the terms, and the courts also found that none of the FAA exceptions
177
applied. Ultimately, these courts found that even if class action was a
protected § 7 right, it can be waived in an arbitration agreement.
The decisions of these courts have even more dangerous
implications for § 7 rights than that of the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in D.R. Horton. Under this line of case law, pursuing class
actions is clearly a substantive § 7 right that can be waived when it is in
an arbitration agreement, regardless of context, thus allowing employers
to require waiver of this right in mandatory arbitration agreements.
However, waiving § 7 rights goes against Supreme Court precedent,
which establishes that substantive rights cannot be waived through
agreement and undermines the NLRA. Furthermore, there is no
precedent indicating that different § 7 rights should be analyzed under
different standards. The implication that necessarily follows from the
above cases, therefore, is that all § 7 rights can be waived in an
arbitration agreement. Otherwise, a new and arbitrary category of § 7
rights has been implicitly created—those rights that can be waived, as
compared to those that cannot be waived. But, courts have never made

175. See Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F.
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012); DeLock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA,
Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784 (E.D. Ark. 2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d
198 (Ct. App. 2012); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012).
176. See DeLock, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 787; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1048; Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d
at 842 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 380.
177. See DeLock, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 789 (The text of the NLRA “contains no command that is
contrary to enforcing the FAA’s mandate”); Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1049; Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d
at 845 (“Because Congress did not expressly provide that it was overriding any provision in the FAA
when it enacted the NLRA ... the Court cannot read such a provision into [the NLRA].”); Nelsen, 144
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 214 (“[T]here is no language in the NLRA ... demonstrating that Congress intended
the employee concerted action rights therein to override the mandate of the FAA.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382 (“The D.R. Horton decision identified
no ‘congressional command’ in the NLRA prohibiting enforcement of an arbitration agreement
pursuant to its terms.”).
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inquiries into the relative values of different § 7 rights, and such inquiries
would add unnecessary complexity to the goal of the NLRA to ensure
that employees have collective rights generally. If these arbitration
agreements are upheld on the mere assertion that the FAA’s policy
should be applied liberally, the NLRA would become a futility because
employers will be incentivized to create arbitration agreements that
waive collective rights, even those beyond class actions, and courts can
continue to apply the FAA liberally in upholding these waivers.
The reasoning of these courts strongly supports the FAA at the
expense of the NLRA. Such prioritizing could potentially allow
employers to restrict employee collective rights through the use of
arbitration agreements. The reasoning of the Board represents a true
accommodation of the two statutes because the accommodation has
minimal impact on the goals of both statutes.
III. Recommendations
Given the divergence between the courts and the Board on the
enforceability of class action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements, this Part explores two possible avenues that could bind the
courts and the Board to the unenforceability of these waivers. First, if the
Supreme Court were to issue a decision, the courts and the Board would
be bound by such an interpretation. In order to best protect the rights of
178
workers, the Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of the Board.
Alternatively, or in addition to, a Supreme Court precedent binding the
Board and the courts, Congress could take action to ensure employers
will not infringe the rights of low-wage workers.
A. The Supreme Court Should Defer to the Board’s Interpretation
of Class Actions as a Section 7 Activity.
Should the Supreme Court decide the issue of the enforceability of
class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements, the Court should
defer to the Board’s interpretation of class action as a § 7 right. Such
deference would be reasonable because of the Board’s expertise in
implementing the NLRA and because such an interpretation avoids conflict
with the FAA through the Supreme Court’s requirement that substantive
rights cannot be waived through agreement. The Board’s latest decision
in Murphy Oil regarding class action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements reaffirmed its decision in D.R. Horton. In Murphy Oil,
however, the Board addressed the arguments of the courts that have
overturned D.R. Horton, primarily the Fifth Circuit’s, and analyzed the
legal issue in the context of federal labor policy in general. The Board

178. See supra note 177.
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found that class action waivers are always invalid in employment
179
contracts.
Thus, the Supreme Court should follow the Murphy Oil Board in
holding that pursuing class actions is a substantive right under the
NLRA. Such a holding would preclude the narrowing of § 7 rights while
avoiding conflict with the FAA because of the principle that substantive
rights cannot be waived through agreement. In doing so, the Supreme
Court should defer to the Board’s interpretation of class action as a
substantive § 7 right. The Board has the “special function of applying the
180
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.”
Like other administrative agencies, the Board is entitled to judicial
deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a statute that it
181
administers. A provision is ambiguous when Congress has not spoken
182
on the precise issue. Because Congress delegated the issue of defining
and accommodating § 7 rights to the Board, a court should not substitute
183
its own judgment for a reasonable interpretation given by the Board.
As discussed in Part II.A, class actions fit well within the boundaries of
established precedent defining § 7 rights. Furthermore, class actions
clearly uphold the purpose of the NLRA. Thus, the pursuit of class
actions as a substantive right under § 7 is a reasonable construction of the
NLRA and courts should not substitute their own judgment over this
issue.
Deferring to this interpretation will not conflict with the FAA or
undermine its purpose, and it will not blur the line between substantive
and procedural rights. First, Board deference on this precise issue does
not present the concerns some courts had over deferring to the Board’s
184
interpretation of the conflict between the NLRA and the FAA.
Deferring to the Board only on the issue of class action as a substantive
§ 7 right does not require any interpretation of the FAA and its policies,
and thus, the deference is limited to that area in which the Board has
expertise—the NLRA. Second, deferring to the Board on this issue and
finding that pursuing a class action is a substantive right leads to the
conclusion that there is no conflict with the FAA for the same reasons
that the Board found no conflict: since pursuing a class action is a
substantive right under the NLRA, Supreme Court precedent dictates
that it cannot be waived through agreement. Because the intent of the
179. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, at *6–7 (Oct. 28, 2014).
180. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
181. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); cf.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
182. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842.
183. Id. at 844.
184. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that no deference was
owed to the Board because it has no expertise in interpreting the FAA); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013).
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FAA was to leave statutory rights alone, § 7 rights cannot be waived
through arbitration agreements. Thus, there is no conflict between the
NLRA and the FAA. Finally, pursuing class actions is the substantive
right under the NLRA, not the right to class action certification: “Rule
23 may be a procedural rule, but the § 7 right to act concertedly by
185
invoking Rule 23, § 216(b), or other legal procedures is not.” The right
to invoke class action procedures should not create any confusion
between the procedural and substantive rights of workers. Ultimately,
Supreme Court deference to the Board on the first issue of substantive
rights under § 7 is consistent with deference principles and will avoid the
problems discussed in Part II.
B. Statutory Fix Could Ensure That Class Action Remains a
Protected Employee Activity.
Given the Supreme Court’s liberal policy toward the FAA, it is
reasonable to predict that D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil will not survive
and class action waivers will be upheld in employment arbitration
agreements. In any case, Congress should consider a statutory fix to
ensure that employees will be able to fully exercise their substantive
rights under all employment statutes, thus preserving federal labor
policy. This could involve either amending the FAA or the NLRA.
The NLRA could be amended in a way that is consistent with the
FAA. In order to avoid conflicting with the FAA and the Supreme
Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration, Congress could add an explicit
command in the NLRA prohibiting class action waivers in employment
contracts. Such a command would satisfy the second exception to the
FAA’s general enforceability rule, a contrary congressional command.
While the second exception to the FAA does not necessarily require an
explicit command, the courts’ generally broad application of the FAA
may lead to unfavorable interpretations of commands that are anything
less than explicit. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in its decision to not
follow D.R. Horton, found the language of the NLRA too general to
constitute a clear contrary congressional command. The Fifth Circuit
specifically pointed out that the NLRA does not mention “arbitration,”
186
or “class action.” In order to ensure that courts will find a contrary
congressional command, Congress should include in the NLRA an
explicit provision designating class action as a protected concerted
activity and a provision that states that all protected concerted activities
cannot be waived in any arbitration agreement.

185. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *10 (Jan. 3, 2012).) (internal
citations omitted).
186. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013).
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A potential problem with inserting such an explicit contrary
congressional command in the NLRA is that it could incentivize those
courts that strongly favor the FAA to find other collective activities
outside of class action—such as social media posts aiming to encourage
group action—as unprotected under § 7. Also, narrowing the provision to
only discuss arbitration waivers of class actions would not account for
changing circumstances. The workplace is constantly evolving and as new
forms of collective activity arise, a narrow NLRA amendment would
offer no protection from the scrutiny of the courts when arbitration
agreements attempt to waive these activities. Under typical statutory
construction tools, an enumeration of class actions could actually support
a court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend a particular collective
activity be a protected § 7 activity.
Amending the FAA might avoid some of the problems discussed
above. An amendment of the FAA should be narrowly tailored to
prohibit class action waivers in the employment context when doing so
would preclude an employee, as defined by the NLRA, from accessing
the court or arbitral system to participate in a class action as defined by
Rule 23. Such an amendment does not prohibit or necessarily discourage
employers from using arbitration. All of the other advantages of
arbitration are still largely intact, as discussed in Part II.B. The
amendment would also be consistent with the current FAA statute
because the FAA does not allow the waiver of substantive rights. In any
case, the narrow scope of the amendment would do little to frustrate the
purpose of the FAA, as class action waivers would not invalidate
arbitration agreements in a wide variety of contexts.
Conclusion
Given employees’ minimal bargaining power in the employeeemployer relationship, many employment-related statutes necessarily
protect low-wage workers from exploitation, from the FLSA, which
guarantees overtime pay and a minimum wage, to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, which maintains health and safety standards in
187
workplaces. The NLRA not only ensures that workers have access to
collective means of ensuring these protections, but it is also meant to
protect industries and the economy by diverting workers away from
disruptive forms of collective activity. Without the ability to bring their
claims as a class, many low-wage workers will be unprotected by the laws
and employers will be incentivized to exploit them. These workers will be
forced to seek redress through other means, including potentially
disruptive actions. This could lead to widespread industrial strife,
considering that many workplace violations, particularly wage theft, are
187. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1 (2016).
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prevalent across industries. Thus, federal labor policy and the purpose of
the NLRA dictate that pursuing class actions is a protected concerted
activity, and the NLRA’s substantive rights should not yield to the FAA
because federal labor policy would be severely frustrated by class action
waivers.
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